Norms and Collective Behaviour
A game-theoretic introduction to norms and collective behaviour
TLDR: Societal norms can be described in terms independent rational agents acting to satisfy preferences. Important distinctions may be drawn between different kinds of collective behaviours given one’s beliefs and desires. Some forms of collective behaviour are well suited for situations requiring large-scale coordination, while others are able to resolve collective action problems.
This piece will introduce four broad categories of collective behaviour, which may also be termed “norms.” These collective behaviours are customs, conventions, moral norms, and social norms. The distinguishing features of these four categories rests the beliefs and normativity motivating each individual in the collective to act. In order to introduce these concepts, Lewis’ account of conventions and Bicchieri’s taxonomy of collective behaviour will be examined, with particular attention being paid to those features that distinguish moral and social norms. This schematisation of collective behaviour will prove to be particularly useful when considering how to resolve coordination and collective action problems.
Beliefs, Expectations, and Normativity
Prior to distinguishing between several kinds of collective social behaviours, it is necessary to first define four kinds of belief that individuals can hold. This is because the norms to be examined below are defined in terms of agents’ beliefs. Bicchieri differentiates two axes by which to evaluate beliefs: a social and a normative dimension (2017, p. 12). The social dimension refers to beliefs that are socially dependent. Which is to say that the veridicality of a social belief depends on one’s reference network. Where a reference network refers to the set of people that an individual considers, either explicitly or implicitly, before making a social decision (2017, p. 14). The second dimension of normativity refers to whether or not a belief has a prescriptive component. Importantly, this normativity can apply to oneself or to others. These two dimensions allow for four species of belief, as demonstrated below.
Taking each in turn, the first kind of beliefs are factual, these are both non-social and non-normative. For instance, beliefs concerning whether or not it will rain tomorrow, the mass of a hydrogen atom, or whether or not Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, are all factual beliefs. These kinds of beliefs are not liable to being either true or false in relation to one’s reference network. The truth of empirical social expectations are, however, dependent on one’s reference network while remaining non-normative. Expectations concerning which side of the road people will drive on, what language people will communicate with, and whether or not others will use Japanese yen or ₿itcoin when purchasing items, are all forms of empirical social expectations. It is worth noting, if it was not already obvious, that an expectation is simply a kind of belief, one that is concerned with what will happen in the future. Of the normative kinds of belief there are both social and non-social varieties. A non-social normative belief is what Bicchieri defines as a personal normative belief. These are characterised by a belief regarding what is appropriate behaviour for oneself and others. For instance, Megan, a high school student, may believe that it is impermissible for her to steal Xanthe’s new phone. Megan may also believe that others around her should also not steal Xanthe’s new phone. Social normative expectations, however, ‘are beliefs about other people’s personal normative beliefs (i.e., they are second order beliefs)’ (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 12). Normative expectations can, therefore, be viewed as a kind of empirical expectation that is concerned only with the personal normative beliefs of others. For example, Steven, a peer to both Megan and Xanthe, may be sitting next to Xanthe and her new phone. Megan may believe that Steven would find it impermissible for her to steal Xanthe’s new phone, and would reprimand her if he witnessed this action. In such a situation, Megan can be said to have a normative expectation concerning Steven’s beliefs about theft.
Normative beliefs can be further distinguished into two varieties. These being, as Bicchieri argues, a prudential kind of normativity, which is grounded in rational self-interest alone, and an obligatory kind of normativity, which is independent, and often contrary, to one’s rational self-interest (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 14). Individuals have many prudential reasons for action. For instance, if Anthony wishes to improve his quality of sleep, rationality dictates that he ought to take appropriate measures to reach this goal, such as removing screens that emit blue light from his bedroom, set and maintain a consistent sleep-wake cycle, and increasing the amount of exercise that he undertakes on a daily basis. In this case the normative “ought,” arises directly out of a desired outcome. An obligatory kind of normativity, however, is considered to be independent of any desired outcome. For instance, the claims that one ought not steal, lie, or cheat, are instances of obligations and they are often asserted without reference, or need, for a higher goal or purpose. Again, these obligations are often, although not always, contrary to rational self-interest. This distinction between prudential and obligatory normativity mirrors the distinction that Kant draws between hypothetical and categorical imperatives for action. Kant writes that hypothetical imperatives ‘represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). [Whereas] the categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary’ (Kant and Gregor, 1999, p. 34). Bicchieri grants that personal normative beliefs may be either prudential or obligatory (2017, p. 9). That being said, the personal normative beliefs involved in either moral or social norms are explicitly of the obligatory, or categorical, kind of normativity (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 14). It should also be noted that while one may doubt (as I do) that there truly exist any obligatory categorical imperatives of this kind, this is not a concern for this analysis; all that matters is that individuals in a community believe that such obligatory reasons for action exist, and that these beliefs drive action.
Customs and Conventions
Prior to describing the salient differences between moral and social norms it will prove worthwhile to briefly introduce both customs and conventions, so as distinguish these forms of collective behaviour from what will follow. It should be noted that the words “custom” and “convention” are often used interchangeably in everyday social discourse, although for my purposes the two words distinguish two different kinds of collective behaviour.
Beginning with customs, which are socially independent behaviours that are almost always individually rational to perform. Customs do not involve conditional preferences or expectations. With Bicchieri’s belief taxonomy in mind, factual beliefs, those beliefs that are both non-social and non-normative, form the foundation for customs. Moreover, customs generally arise out of particular needs that people have, and individuals within a group will often exhibit similar behaviours as those around them. Consider the case of a beach-goer, Bob, who decides that he will wear sunscreen while enjoying an afternoon at the beach. There exist a number of factual beliefs concerning the current, or potential, state of affairs for Bob. Some of these factual beliefs include: It can be expected that there will be a significant level of UV light outside, there will be little to no cloud cover, Bob believes that he will spend multiple hours outside without wearing much clothing, prolonged sun exposure dramatically increases the risk of sunburn and skin cancer, etc. Bob also has a number of personal preferences, most importantly in this case is his desire to avoid sunburn and skin cancer. Thus, given all of the relevant factual beliefs, in conjunction with his preferences, there exists a rational incentive (a hypothetical imperative) to wear sunscreen. This means that customs rest on both factual beliefs and personal preferences, which when combined, produces a rational incentive to act so as to meet one’s goals and satisfy one’s preferences.
It is important to recognise that the existence of a hypothetical imperative to act does not automatically imply the existence of a custom. As will become clear shortly, conventions also involve hypothetical imperatives, although crucially they are not grounded in factual beliefs. What is required for a custom to exist is that there are a sufficient number of other individuals who, when in analogous situations, have approximately similar factual beliefs and preferences that result in approximately similar rational incentives to act. Which is to say that customs are simply cases wherein ‘each actor acts independently, and the result is an emergent pattern of behaviour that reproduces itself’ (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 15). Returning to the example of Bob the beach-goer, when Bob is at the beach he notices many other individuals who are also enjoying the beach in much that same way that he is. All of these individuals are also wearing sunscreen because they too have similar factual beliefs and preferences to avoid sunburn and skin cancer. In this way, ‘the consistency of the pattern is due to the actors’ similar motivations and conditions’ (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 15).
While customs are grounded in factual beliefs conventions involve empirical expectations, and because of this it is necessary to introduce the concept of “common knowledge.” Very simply, something is common knowledge when everyone knows it, and when everyone knows that everyone knows it, and when everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows it, and so on ad infinitum. In this way, ‘common knowledge is the limit of a potentially infinite chain of reasoning about knowledge’ (Geanakoplos, 1992, p. 54). As will become clear momentarily, the concept of common knowledge is useful when considering interdependent human action.
As already mentioned conventions involve socially dependent preferences and expectations. Lewis (1969) was the first to provide a rigorous philosophical analysis of the structure of a convention, although they have been considered and discussed for centuries (Mackie, 2003, p. 82). Lewis defines a convention as:
‘A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in almost every instance of S among members of P,
(1) almost everyone conforms to R;
(2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R
(3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
(4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on condition that almost everyone conform to R;
(5) almost everyone would prefer that any one more would conform to Rʹ, on condition that almost everyone conform to Rʹ,
where Rʹ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among members of P could conform to both Rʹ and R’ (1969, p. 78).
In this way, Lewis asserts that common knowledge, along with a basic level of rationality, will allow all members of the population, P, to form any arbitrarily higher order belief or expectation concerning the actions and beliefs of others. Importantly, conventions represent a Nash equilibrium of a coordination game, demonstrated by the fact that it is ‘not possible that any one of the agents would have been better off if [they] alone had acted differently and all the rest had acted just as they did’ (Lewis, 1969, p. 8). Agents faced with coordination problems are not challenged by a divergence between individual and collective rationality, as is the case with collective action problems, but rather face the challenge of aligning their behaviour with that of everyone else. In this way, Lewis’ conventions provide a means of resolving coordination problems through shared empirical expectations and common knowledge.
All of this is worth reiterating with the aid of an example. Consider two Australian drivers, Scott and Samantha, who are both driving in opposite directions on a suburban Melbourne road. Scott knows from past experience that it is expected of him to drive on the left side of the road. Importantly, Scott and Samantha’s situations are symmetric, what is true for Scott is also true for Samantha. Thus, Scott, without knowing Samantha personally, can be expected to believe that she knows that it is expected of her to drive on the left side of the road. This belief forms yet another higher order belief because Scott can be expected to believe that Samantha believes that he is expected to drive on the left side of the road. And so on ad infinitum. In this way, for a convention to exist in a community there must exist common knowledge of the regularity in behaviour, such that each member of the community is able to form any nth-order belief or expectation concerning the actions of others in relation to that regularity in behaviour.¹
For Lewis, it must be the case that almost everyone prefers to conform to the regularity in behaviour given that almost everyone does conform. In short, it is individually rational to conform if others do. Furthermore, almost everyone must have approximately the same kind of nested, or conditional, preferences regarding their own, and others’, actions. Thus, a convention involves interdependent social preferences. Returning to the case of Scott and Samantha, Samantha prefers to drive on the left side of the road given her belief that Scott will drive on the left. It is not in her own, or Scott’s, best interest to drive on the right side of the road if she believes that Scott is driving on the left. Therefore, a convention is a situation where ‘each [person] wants to conform conditionally upon the conformity [of] others, conforming action produces expectation of conforming action and expectation of conforming action produces conforming action’ (Lewis, 1969, p. 42). Meaning that given that there exists shared empirical expectations and shared preferences, what follows is a shared hypothetical imperative to conform to the convention.
The final clause of Lewis’ definition means that there must exist an alternative regularity in behaviour, Rʹ, which would also satisfy the first four clauses of the definition. In the example involving Scott and Samantha the alternative to driving on the left is driving on the right side of the road, something that is conventional in many countries around the world. This aspect of conventions is important to keep in mind because it highlights the arbitrariness of the actual behaviour, R or Rʹ, which has become conventional. It is for this reason that Lewis claims that ‘there is no such thing as the only possible convention [in any recurrent situation]’ (1969, p. 70). A regularity in behaviour that is not arbitrary would not be a convention because there would not exist any interdependent preferences for action based on the expected behaviour of others. ‘We would conform [to this non-arbitrary regularity in behaviour] simply because it is the best thing to do, [independent of others]’ (Lewis, 1969, p. 70).
Moral and Social Norms
Unfortunately the philosophical literature addressing moral norms has thus far failed to reach a consensus concerning the exact character of these kinds of norms and what differentiates them from other forms of collective behaviour, such as social norms (Handfield and Thrasher, 2019; O’Neill, 2017; Southwood, 2011; Sugden, 2010). Take, as an example, Elster who distinguishes ‘social norms from moral norms in terms of the emotions sustaining them and the causal structures that link emotions to norm violations’ (2009, p. 196). Very briefly, Elster asserts that social norms are primarily sustained by an awareness of others’ observations and an anticipatory aversion to the feeling of shame that will accompany a norm violation. Whereas moral norms, Elster argues, are primarily sustained by the emotion of guilt and are maintained without the need for any third-party observation (Elster, 2009, p. 196). While interesting, Elster’s categorisation relies heavily on psychological features of moral emotions, the veridicality of which is both dubious (in my opinion) and beyond the scope of this piece. Bicchieri’s (2017, 2006) distinction between moral and social norms in terms of beliefs and expectations will prove more useful in this context because it accommodates the methodology of game theory. Because of this, Bicchieri’s definitions of moral and social norms will be employed to the exclusion of Elster’s henceforth.
For Bicchieri a moral norm is a regularity in behaviour that is motivated by personal reasons for action that are independent to one’s reference network. This is to say that individuals ‘have reasons for upholding what [they] take to be moral norms that go beyond the fact that [they] perceive them to be generally upheld by a reference network that may reproach deviance. [One’s] commitment to these moral norms is independent of what [they] expect others to believe, do, or approve/disapprove of’ (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 33). In short, moral norms are grounded in personal normative beliefs, where these normative beliefs are taken to be obligatory. It is worth noting that multiple authors defend this conception of moral norms as being established by normative beliefs that are independent of social considerations. As already mentioned, Elster asserts that guilt, an emotion that he claims is not mediated by others, is the primary motivating force for moral norm adherence (2009, p. 196). In addition to this, Southwood defends what he calls the “Grounds view,” which states that ‘moral judgements are normative judgements that may not be grounded, even in part, in presumed social practices’ (2011, p. 780).
It is important to stress that the personal normative beliefs that form the foundation for moral norms are viewed as being obligatory, or as categorical imperatives for action. This does not imply that all moral norms are actually grounded in, or justified by, categorical imperatives for action, only that those who adhere to the moral norm believe that they are. Bicchieri repeatedly emphasises the fact that ‘what makes something a social or a moral norm is our attitude toward it’ (2006, p. 21). Therefore, what distinguishes moral norms from customs is that customs are the result of hypothetical imperatives for action, whereas moral norms are the result of categorical imperatives for action. This realisation also highlights why individual preferences do not form part of the foundation for moral norms, categorical imperatives are, by definition, deontic and outcome independent. Meaning that categorical imperatives are not in the business of satisfying preferences through the attainment of desired goals with the aid of rational consideration. In fact, categorical imperatives that are personal normative beliefs are often contrary to what could be conceived as being in one’s rational best interest. For instance, if Megan, from the example described above, found herself alone with Xanthe’s new phone and could reasonably believe that her act of theft would not be able to be traced back to her, it seems as though, ethical considerations aside, it is rational for Megan to steal Xanthe’s new phone. Pulling all of this together, a moral norm exists for Bicchieri when there exists a sufficiently large number of individuals who believe that they are obligated to act, categorically, due to the existence of their personal normative beliefs alone.
In comparison, social norms, Bicchieri contends, are grounded in two kinds of socially interdependent forms of belief: these being empirical and normative expectations (Bicchieri, 2017, p. 34). Bicchieri’s definition for the existence and conformity to a social norm is as follows:
‘Let R be a behavioural rule for situations of type S, where S can be represented as a mixed-motive game. We say that R is a social norm in a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pcf ⊆ P such that, for each individual i ∈ Pcf:
Contingency: i knows that a rule R exists and applies to situations of type S;
Conditional preference: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S on condition that:
(a) Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P conforms to R in situations of type S;
and either
(b) Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P expects i to conform to R in situations of type S;
or
(bʹ) Normative expectations with sanctions: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P expects i to conform to R in situations of type S, prefers i to conform, and may sanction behaviour.
A social norm R is followed by a population P if there exists a sufficiently large subset Pf ⊆ Pcf such that, for each individual i ∈ Pf, conditions 2(a) and either 2(b) or 2(bʹ) are met for i and, as a result, i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S’ (2006, p. 11).
It is significant that Bicchieri makes a distinction, in terms of the relevant populations, between the existence of a social norm and the following of this norm. For Bicchieri, the existence of a social norm is defined in relation to a population, Pcf (the population with conditional preferences for following), which is a sufficiently large subset of the overall population, P. Whereas the conformance to a social norm is defined in relation to the population, Pf (the population who follow the norm), which is both a sufficiently large subset of the population with conditional preferences, Pcf, and the overall population, P. This implies that ‘a rule R can be social norm for a population P even if it is not currently being followed by P’ (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 11). Meaning that, as was the case with Lewis’ conventions, universal acknowledgement of, and adherence to, a social norm is not necessary for it to exist, or for it to be followed (Lewis, 1969, p. 77). It should also be noted that common knowledge of the relevant population, either Pcf or Pf, is not required for either conditional or actual conforming behaviour. This is because ‘different individuals will have different beliefs about the size of Pf [or Pcf] and thus have different empirical expectations’ (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 12). This, however, should not be taken to mean that common knowledge of a social norm never exists, simply that it is not required for the existence of a social norm according to Bicchieri.²
Turning now to each clause of the definition. The contingency condition asserts that each individual, i, within a sufficiently large subset of the population, Pcf or Pf, is aware that the behavioural regularity, R, exists and applies to all of the relevant situations of type S. This first condition lays the foundation for the second conditional preference condition. This conditional preference condition states that the reason that people prefer to conform to the behavioural regularity, R, is due to the confluence of their empirical and normative expectations. As already mentioned above, an empirical expectation is a non-normative and socially dependent belief. This species of belief is concerned with the actions that others in one’s reference network can reasonably be expected to perform, or have performed. Consider, for instance, the social norm requiring individuals to dispose of their rubbish responsibly with the use of rubbish bins. Suppose, further, that Ariadne is walking through a pristine local park on a sunny Sunday morning. While walking Ariadne may witness multiple people discarding their rubbish in the bins provided. Alternatively, she may simply observe a lack of detritus in and around the park. In either case, these experiences will lead Ariadne to believe that a sufficiently large number of park-goers are not littering. This is an empirical expectation concerning the actions of others around her, there is no normativity concerning what others should be doing at this stage.
Normative expectations, potentially with the plausible threat of sanctions, must also accompany the empirical expectations in the second conditional preference condition. Normative expectations can be thought of as very similar to empirical expectations, except that normative expectations are concerned with the personal normative beliefs of others as opposed to the actual behaviour that others perform. These beliefs are concerned with how one believes others believe that one ought to behave. For instance, Ariadne may believe that others believe that she ought to refrain from littering while traversing her local park. The personal normative beliefs that are relevant for social norms must be regarded as obligatory beliefs concerning the acceptability of other’s actions. This is because prudential, or hypothetical, imperatives for action require, as a pre-condition, a set of desired goals that an individual can achieve with the aid of rational action. The reason that prudential normative beliefs are not sufficient is because others may not hold the necessary preferences (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 14). Returning to the scenario involving Ariadne, others in the park around Ariadne do not believe that she ought to refrain from littering if she also desires to walk through a pristine park; they believe that she ought to refrain from littering whether or not she wants to. In short, others believe that Ariadne is obligated, independently of her own preferences, to dispose of her litter responsibly. Furthermore, it is common in cases of social norms that conformance results in a less desirable outcome for the individual, while the collective welfare as a whole is enhanced. This is why Bicchieri refers to the conformance of social norms as ‘contrary to self-interest, especially if [self-interest is defined] in purely material terms’ (2006, p. 16).
It should also be noted that people will comply, and believe that others should comply, with a social norm for different reasons. Suppose that there are three other individuals, Ottis, Rohit and, Jess, who are also walking through the same park as Ariadne. Ottis believes that both he and others should refrain from littering in the park because his religious convictions prohibit all such actions. Alternatively, Rohit is a staunch environmentalist and believes that everyone has an obligation to refrain from littering so as to protect the environment. Finally, Jess has a strong personal sense of fairness and believes that if she is required to refrain from littering then that implies that everyone else ought to refrain also. What this example highlights is that ‘for every social norm we may think of, we will find some reason why followers think it should be upheld’ (2017, p. 34). These reasons need not converge, or even be veridical. Furthermore, as was the case with empirical expectations, second-order normative beliefs need not be veridical either. It may be the case that a community holds a social norm while every member of this community personally despises the practice and wishes that things were different. This is a situation where everyone holds a false normative expectation concerning the beliefs of others. Everyone believes others believe that they ought to perform some set of actions, when in reality no one believes this. Bicchieri describes such a situation as being an instance of “pluralistic ignorance” (2006, p. 186).
With all of this in mind, a social norm is said to exist if there is a sufficiently large subset of the population, Pcf, who are aware that a behavioural regularity, R, exists (contingent condition) and who have a conditional preference for conforming to this regularity based on empirical and normative expectations (conditional preference condition). Furthermore, a social norm is said to be followed if there exists a subset of the population, Pf, who know that a behavioural regularity, R, exists (contingent condition) and who follow this regularity based conditionally on their empirical and normative expectations (conditional preference condition). Thus, for Ariadne to be conforming to the social norm prohibiting littering in her local park she must have an empirical expectation that leads her to believe that most others in the park do not litter, while also believing that most others in the park believe that she has an obligation not to litter, potentially resulting in negative sanctions if she failed to conform. All of these beliefs must then converge so as to result in a preference to conform to the social norm of not littering. Notice, therefore, that an individual following a social norm is actually doing so because of a rational incentive, a hypothetical imperative, to avoid the censure and scorn of those in their reference network. This is another interesting feature of social norms. Given the empirical and normative expectations of others, Ariadne now has a prudential incentive to conform to the social norm. It is for this reason that Bicchieri describes social norms as transforming, as opposed to resolving, collective action problems into coordination games (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 27).
This detail is worth exploring in greater depth. For Bicchieri, social norms transform collective action problems into coordination problems that may be resolved with the same mechanism that was employed with conventions. The normative expectation condition, either with or without the threat of sanctions, transforms collective action problems by altering the relative value of the payoffs such that the situation is perceived as a coordination problem for all agents. Thus, there is a sense in which there exist two levels of analysis that are appropriate when evaluating how social norms transform, and ultimately resolve, collective action problems. At the first level one’s normative expectation regarding other’s beliefs transforms the collective action problem into a coordination problem by altering the relative payoff for each course of action (2006, p. 26). At the second level, after the game has been transformed, one’s empirical expectations regarding how others will act when paired with self-interested rationality suffice to resolve the coordination problem in exactly the same manner that Lewis’ conventions solve coordination problems. Finally, recall that conventions represent a Nash equilibrium of a coordination game (Lewis, 1969, p. 42), meaning that the obtaining of a social norm is also a Nash equilibrium of the transformed collective action problem. Put differently, while ‘a convention solves an original coordination game, a norm transforms […] an original mixed-motive game into a coordination game and at the same time helps players to select one equilibrium’ (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 38). With all of this in mind, it is clear how social norms are able to first transform, and ultimately resolve, collective action problems for purely self-interested rational individuals.
Concluding Remarks
Despite the neat theoretical distinctions drawn in this piece, it should be recognised how challenging it can be to discern between diverging beliefs grounding a collective behaviour for any given individual. This is less the case with customs and conventions, which are grounded in non-normative beliefs and rational incentives, because these motivations are often easier to identify.³ However, distinguishing between personal normative beliefs and normative expectations, these being the beliefs that undergird moral and social norms, can prove to be very difficult. Two individuals, one conforming to a moral norm with another conforming to a social norm, may outwardly behave identically, and may even, when questioned, provide strikingly similar justifications for their behaviour. This is not a theoretical concern, just something to be cognizant of.
Additionally, it should also be recognised that it will often be inappropriate to describe those normative collective behaviours (e.g. saying “please” and “thank you,”or wearing a mask when around others) as being exclusively a moral or a social norm. While it is theoretically possible that a collective behaviour represents either a moral or a social norm for all members of society, this seems exceedingly unlikely in reality. It is far more likely that some individuals will be unconditionally committed to the collective behaviour; in this way they will choose to conform to the norm independently to how those in their reference network behave (moral norm followers). Whereas others will be conditionally committed given their belief in the commitment, conditional or otherwise, of others (social norm followers). Echoing this possibility, Bicchieri writes how ‘for some individuals, [a] rule may be so important that it becomes (socially) unconditional. These individuals do not need to take into consideration the behaviour of their peers when deciding whether to follow the rule. For other individuals, the choice to abide by the rule may be conditional on their social expectations’ (2017, p. 32).
The key, then, to understanding everything outlined in this piece is the recognition that all collective behaviour can be distinguished, and explained, in terms of individual agents acting on the basis of their beliefs and preferences. At a fundamental level, all collectives are comprised of individuals.
Thank you very much for your time! Any support would be greatly appreciated.
[1]: Lewis is quick to point out that in reality it is unlikely that people adhering to a convention will truly hold beliefs and expectations about others that are higher than three or four levels of complexity (1969, p. 55). However, this is not a concern; all that matters is that people could generate any arbitrarily high level of conditional expectations concerning others’ actions and beliefs if they needed or wanted to.
[2]: Lewis would likely disagree. However, Lewis only includes the requirement of common knowledge in his definition in order to avoid counterintuitive, and highly unrealistic, counter examples to his position (Lewis, 1969, p. 60).
[3]: People have no reason to lie about why they’re adhering to a custom or convention; it’s in their best interest to conform, and to be honest about it. The same can’t always be said for moral and social norms (social norms especially).
References:
Bicchieri, C., 2017. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. Oxford University Press.
Bicchieri, C., 2006. The Grammar of Society: The nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J., 2009. Norms, in: The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology.
Geanakoplos, J., 1992. Common knowledge. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, 53–82.
Handfield, T., Thrasher, J., 2019. Two of a kind: Are norms of honor a species of morality? Biology & Philosophy 34, 39.
Kant, I., Gregor, M., 1999. The metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Mackie, J.L., 2003. Hume’s moral theory. Routledge.
O’Neill, E., 2017. Kinds of norms. Philosophy Compass 12. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12416
Southwood, N., 2011. The moral/conventional distinction. Mind 120, 761–802.
Sugden, R., 2010. Is There a Distinction between Morality and Convention? Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
